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The Use of Fixed-rate 
and Floating-rate Debt 
for Hotels
By JOHN B. (JACK) CORGEL and SCOTT GIBSON
A tim e-series simulation tha t compares hotel-industry 
revenue per available room (RevPAR) w ith  London 
Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR) indicates tha t hotel 
investors would fare m ore favorably w ith  floating-rate 
loans than w ith  the  com m only used fixed-rate financ­
ing. Using data from  1987 through 2004, the  study 
determ ined tha t LIBOR and RevPAR changes are 
s tro n g ly  co rre la ted , ind ica ting  a re la tio n sh ip  o f 
RevPAR and floating interest rates. Moreover, a s im u­
lation found that hotels using variable-rate mortgages 
would have been m ore likely to  cover debt service in 
good tim es and bad than would hotels financed w ith  
fixed-rate loans. The correlation was strongest for 
midscale, lim ited-service properties but also operated 
fo r budget and reso rt deals. The re lationship  o f 
RevPAR w ith  floating rates suggests a reduction in the 
c o s ts  to  b o rro w e rs  and le n d e rs  a ris in g  fro m  
distressed loans.
Keywords: hotel financing; fixed-rate and floating- 
rate mortgages; debt-service coverage; 
RevPAR
Hotel company CFOs and property-level inves­tors carefully consider decisions regarding the relative proportions o f debt and equity that go into capital structures. The financing decision does not 
end, however, with the determination o f the extent of 
leverage. Other important decisions remain—not the 
least important o f which is whether the interest for that 
debt should carry fixed or floating rates.1
This issue arises largely because hotel properties 
represent a special category o f commercial real estate, 
the users o f which agree to short-term (usually, daily) 
tenancy, as compared with long-term leases typical o f 
other commercial real estate. The resulting volatility 
ofrevenues is a defining characteristic ofhotels, a fea­
ture cited by investors as the reason that hotel proper­
ties are viewed as riskier investments than other types 
o f real estate.2 Despite their variable cash flows, for 
hotels— as with most other types o f commercial prop­
erty— long-term, fixed-rate mortgages with constant 
debt-service payments are the common means of 
financing.3 This makes sense with office- and retail- 
property investments, for example, where the structure
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o f fixed lease payments is intended to 
allow the property to generate net operat­
ing income o f sufficient size to cover debt 
service. The potential volatility o f hotel- 
p roperty revenues due to occupancy 
uncertainty, however, may result in a 
greater number o f periods when fixed 
d e b t-se rv ic e  p a y m en ts  ex ceed  n e t 
operating income, leading to possible 
delinquency and default.
One way to mitigate this risk might be 
to contract for variable debt-service pay­
ments to align cash outflows with chang­
ing revenues. This financing strategy 
raises obvious questions about how 
closely payments on floating-rate debt 
match hotel revenue streams. Indeed, one 
might expect interest rates and hotel reve­
nues to exhibit a positive relationship. 
When the economy is strong, the demand 
for money increases, causing interest rates 
to increase. That is the same economic 
environment in which the demand for lei­
sure and business travel increases, causing 
hotel revenues to increase. Empirical evi­
dence supports this observation regarding 
the procyclical tendencies o f hotel reve­
nues. Wheaton and Rossoff’s econometric 
results suggest that “the demand for hotel- 
night stays moves closely with U.S. GDP. 
only modified with a rental rate elasticity 
o f demand.”4
In this study, we examine the viability 
o f floating-rate, debt-financing strategies 
by investigating the time-series relation­
ships between London Interbank Offer 
Rate (LIBOR), the index typically used in 
floating-rate debt contracts, and revenue 
per available room (RevPAR). The strong 
correlations we find from this analysis 
suggest that hotel investors who match 
interest payments with hotel revenues by 
using floating-rate debt (rather than rely­
ing on fixed-rate financing) can success­
fully manage the financial distress ofdebt.
Why Hotel Owners Should Care about the Fixed- versus Floating-rate Decision
Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller 
laid the foundation for the study o f corpo­
rate financing decisions in the 1950s.5 The 
Modigliani-Miller theorem, which was 
largely responsible for both researchers’ 
winning a Nobel Prize in economics, 
states that if  financing choices do not 
affect the total cash flows that a firm dis­
tributes to its debt and equity holders, then 
financing choices do not affect the total 
value o f a firm’s debt and equity. Stated 
positively, for a firm’s financing decisions 
to have valuation implications, they must 
affect the total cash flows generated by the 
firm. Issues relating to managing the costs 
o f  financial distress are o f particular 
importance when considering the fixed- 
ra te  v ersu s f lo a tin g -ra te  fin an c in g  
decision for hotel owners.
It goes without saying that financial 
distress adversely affects the total cash 
flows generated by hotels, with losses 
resulting from default and foreclosure 
usually spreading to debt holders as well 
as to equity interests.6 As too many hotel 
investors have learned, the direct costs of 
financial distress include legal fees, court 
costs, and advisory fees for accountants 
and investment bankers. In addition to 
these direct costs, various indirect costs 
reduce value when a hotel is in financial 
distress, even if  the hotel owner has not 
filed for bankruptcy. Some examples of 
these indirect costs are as follows:
• Those without capital invested may fear 
that the hotel will not be able to make 
good on its commitments and may alter 
their actions in ways that adversely 
affect the hotel. For example, good 
employees may seek jobs elsewhere and 
suppliers may tighten their trade-credit 
terms;
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• Hotel management may be distracted 
from running the business by having to 
negotiate with lawyers and creditors; and
• Delinquency may cause lenders to exer­
cise more control over operating and 
financing decisions, thus reducing the 
value of owners’ options.
Given the direct and indirect costs of 
financial distress, the determination of 
financing with fixed rates or with floating 
rates takes on considerable implications 
for hotel valuation. To maximize value, 
the objective is to structure interest pay­
ments such that any cost o f financial dis­
tress is m inim ized. This objective is 
accomplished by aligning interest pay­
ments, to the extent possible, with operat­
ing cash flows produced by financed 
assets. Simply stated, when operating 
cash flows decline, it is desirous to have 
interest-payment obligations coincidently 
decrease , thus m itig a tin g  the  costs 
associated with financial distress.
Interest-rate Sensitivity of Hotel Properties and Firms
Recently, Deutsche Bank provided 
$1.2 billion in debt financing for Strategic 
Hotel Capital’s initial public offering. The 
company’s debt package includes a gener­
ous mixture of both fixed-rate and float- 
ing-rate debt. Although we do not directly 
analyze this arrangement, we examine the 
following related questions: Does this 
structure expose Strategic Hotel Capital 
investors to acceptable levels o f financial 
distress? Should hotel firms use more 
floating-rate debt, or does the reverse 
structure dominate? and Are hotel owners 
always wise to lock into fixed-rate mort­
gages during periods o f relatively low 
interest rates as homeowners often do and 
to ignore floating-rate financing choices?
Hotel CFOs and investors use floating- 
rate debt, as the Strategic Hotel Capital 
example indicates, but no previous studies
confirm or refute the argument that hotel 
revenues and interest rates are closely cor­
related across market segments and over a 
variety o f alternative time horizons. In this 
study, we analyze the patterns o f LIBOR 
with those o f RevPAR for the United 
States and for key hotel market segments, 
locations, and individual properties since 
1987. These data are organized in several 
ways, including comparisons o f levels, 
relative changes, and subperiods to 
uncover subtle time-series relationships. 
In the final section ofthis article, we com­
pare debt-coverage ratios during the study 
period for fixed-rate and floating-rate 
financing using cash-flow assumptions 
for three important business models in the 
industry: full-service, limited-service, and 
resort operations.
Data and Methodology
The empirical analysis performed here 
begins with a detailed examination o f the 
time-series relationships between short­
term interest-rate series commonly used in 
hotel debt financing (i.e., three-month 
LIBOR) and RevPAR time series for all 
market segments and location subdivi­
sions reported by Smith Travel Research 
(STR). Then, we estimate the same time- 
series relationships using an STR sample 
o f individual hotel properties’ RevPARs 
and LIBOR. We rely heavily on graphical 
presentations ofthe time-series data, easy- 
to-understand statistical methods—pri- 
marily Pearson correlation coefficients 
and /-tests—and straightforward simula­
tion exercises to develop conclusions.7
All RevPAR data come from STR and 
possess the characteristics described 
below.
• Monthly observations from the begin­
ning period of the STR time series, Janu­
ary 1987 (1987 M1) through February 
2004 (2004 M2).
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• Aggregated hotel performance informa­
tion for the United States—for each 
STR chain scale (i.e., luxury, upper 
upscale, upscale, midscale with food 
and beverage, midscale without food 
and beverage, economy, and independ­
ent) and for each of the STR location 
segments (i.e., urban, suburban, airport, 
highway, and resort).
• Disaggregated hotel performance infor­
mation for hundreds of hotels within 
each STR chain scale and location 
segment.
• Performance data during every month, 
including the number of properties, 
room revenue, number of rooms avail­
able, and number of rooms sold for each 
chain scale and location segment.
We seasonally adjust RevPARs for this 
analysis for two reasons. First, seasonal 
adjustments to RevPARs create monthly 
time series that match with nonseasonal 
LIBOR series to provide an objective 
econometric analysis o f the relationships 
between the two time series. The same 
type o f adjustment would be needed if  one 
o f the series contained a trend or drift 
component. Second, seasonality should 
not be an issue in this analysis, because 
hotels’ seasonality can be anticipated. 
Consider the experienced hotel owner 
who fully understands that the hotel will 
have seasons when revenues are high and 
seasons when revenues are low. This hotel 
owner will make decisions, including 
financial decisions, based on knowledge 
o f seasonality. Most important, the owner 
will set money aside during good seasons 
to cover debt-service obligations during 
bad seasons. For this reason, seasonality is 
not consequential to the underlying eco­
nomic decision regarding the choice of 
debt. We can also look at the seasonality 
issue from a delinquency and default per­
spective. The hotel owner will not become 
delinquent during bad seasons and then 
become current during good seasons, 
while expecting to retain business rela­
tionships with lenders. In summary, we 
are intellectually interested here in the 
financial decisions o f  ho tel ow ners 
through the long-term business cycle and 
not interested in how they manage short­
term cash-flow needs in the presence of 
highly predictable events.
The analysis must include a deflator, 
due to the fact that inflation accumulates 
in RevPAR over time via its average daily 
rate (ADR) component. Thus, it is appro­
priate in time-series studies o f this type to 
convert RevPARs from nominal to real 
terms and thereby put the time series on an 
equal footing.8 Although the ADR part o f 
RevPAR picks up inflation as we move 
through time, neither debt-service time 
series has this cumulative feature. The 
fixed-payment debt service is set by con­
tract. The floating-payment debt service is 
continually reset without a cumulative 
inflation component. Again, the underly­
ing economics of financial distress over 
time are the relevant considerations. Spe­
cifically, we are interested in the ability of 
hotel demand and supply conditions at dif­
ferent points in the cycle to provide cover­
age under alternative financing scenarios.
The Federal Reserve makes data avail­
able for several short-term and long-term 
interest-rate series. Because hotels’ debt 
contracts norm ally include paym ent- 
adjustment provisions based on short­
term interest-rate movements, only short­
term interest-rate series appear in this 
study. We perform the analyses withthree- 
month LIBOR, although several interest- 
rate series were tested. All o f the LIBOR 
series commonly found in hotel debt con­
tracts (i.e., one-month LIBOR, three- 
month LIBOR, and one-year LIBOR) 
move in close synchronization with one 
another, with strong statistical correla­
tions. Exhibit 1 presents descriptions and 
summary statistics for all RevPAR and 
interest-rate variables in this study.
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Exh ib it 1:
Data D escrip tions
Variable M ean M edian a M axim um M in im um
LIBOR 5.39% 5.71% 2.25% 10.31% 1 .1 2 %
RUS $53.30 $53.96 $2.97 $60.89 $45.71
RLUX $140.75 $138.71 $26.11 $199.82 $103.66
RUU $92.90 $91.35 $8 . 2 2 $111.82 $70.03
RUP $68.41 $66.75 $5.09 $79.62 $57.76
RMFB $45.41 $45.75 $2 . 8 8 $50.62 $38.81
RMID $43.25 $43.33 $2.25 $48.04 $39.38
RECO $30.55 $29.71 $3.26 $38.49 $24.73
RIND $51.06 $51.41 $2.79 $59.38 $45.71
RURB $73.79 $72.18 $6.91 $92.36 $59.33
RSUB $47.09 $47.61 $2.43 $52.66 $41.66
RAIR $53.92 $54.82 $3.80 $61.79 $45.08
RHW $38.15 $38.04 $1.72 $42.14 $34.56
RRES $80.68 $80.13 $4.84 $95.81 $68.61
CLIBOR -0 .0 8b p -0 .54bp 0.57bp 1.06bp -1.52bp
CRUS $0.27 $0.43 $1.47 $3.38 - 8 . 2 0
CRLUX $1.30 $2.08 $8 . 2 2 $27.34 -$48.21
CRUU $0.49 $0 . 8 6 $4.31 $13.62 -$27.21
CRUP $0.33 $0.61 $2 . 1 2 $4.71 - $ 1 2 . 1 2
CRMFB $0.17 $0.31 $ 1 . 0 2 $2.24 -$4.86
CRMID $0.30 $0.40 $0.82 $2.15 -$3.31
CRECO $0.04 $0 . 1 1 $0.55 $1.23 -$1.07
CRIND $0.28 $0.38 $1.36 $2.84 -$6.36
CRURB $0.44 $0.89 $3.19 $9.21 -$19.13
CRSUB $0 . 2 2 $0.39 $1.06 $2.32 -$5.51
CRAIR $0.23 $0.41 $1.57 $2.73 -$8.82
CRHW $0.17 $0.26 $0.69 $ 1 . 6 6 -$2 .25
CRRES $0.54 $0.57 $3.00 $7.19 -$15.56
Source: Smith Travel Research and Federal Reserve
Note: This table presents summary statistics for the variables used in this study. LIBOR = Three-month London Interbank 
Offer Rate; RUS = Revenue per Available Room (RevPAR) U.S. Total; RLUX = RevPAR Luxury Segment; RUU = 
RevPAR Upper Upscale Segment; RUP = RevPAR Upscale Segment; RMFB = RevPAR Midprice with F&B Segment; 
RMID = RevPAR Midprice without F&B Segment; RECO = RevPAR Economy Segment; RIND = RevPAR Independent 
Segment; RURB = RevPAR Urban Location; RSUB = RevPAR Suburban Location; RAIR = RevPAR Airport Location; 
RHW = RevPAR Highway Location; RRES = RevPAR Resort Location; CLIBOR = Change in LIBOR; CRUS = Change in 
Revenue Per Available Room (RevPAR) U.S. Total; CRLUX = Change in RevPAR Luxury Segment; CRUU = Change in 
RevPAR Upper Upscale Segment; CRUP = Change in RevPAR Upscale Segment; CRMFB = Change in RevPAR Midprice 
with F&B Segment; CRMID = Change in RevPAR Midprice without F&B Segment; CRECO = Change in RevPAR Econ­
omy Segment; CRIND = Change in RevPAR Independent Segment; CRURB = Change in RevPAR Urban Location; 
CRSUB = Change in RevPAR Suburban Location; CRAIR = Change in RevPAR Airport Location; CRHW = Change in 
RevPAR Highway Location; and CRRES = Change in RevPAR Resort Location. N  = 206 (months); n  = 67 (quarters).
Economic Analysis of U.S. Borrowing Rates and RevPAR
As we discussed above, evaluations of 
the financial performance o f hotel markets
often begin with assumptions about the 
close relationships between macroeco­
nomic fluctuations (i.e., the business cycle) 
and the sales o f hotel room nights. It is rea­
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sonable therefore to posit a connection 
between interest rates and hotel revenues, 
even though connections between the real- 
estate and financial sectors of the economy 
are seldom direct. As economic down­
turns and recoveries occur. the patterns 
o f interest-rate changes and hotel book­
ings may be unsynchronized because dif­
ferent sets o f consumption behavior affect 
travel decisions and those about borrow­
ing and lending. Any connection between 
interest rates and hotel-room sales is fur­
ther clouded by the fact that the determi­
nants o f average daily rate and occupancy 
come in part from the supply side o f the 
market. in which investment consider­
ations dominate. as well as the demand 
side. Thus, the underlying processes that 
drive the interest-rate and RevPAR rela­
tionship consists o f a complicated set o f 
consumption and investment influences. 
Stated differently, specifying this relation­
ship may not be obvious but should, 
instead, result from a managed, empirical 
exercise.
RevPAR and LIBOR Levels
We begin the empirical examination of 
hotel RevPARs and LIBOR comovement 
with the graph in Exhibit 2, which shows 
the tim e-series pattern o f  to tal U.S. 
RevPAR (adjusted for season and infla­
tion) and three-month LIBOR. Visually, 
the two series appear to be highly corre­
lated throughout most o f the period from 
1987 M1 through 2004 M2. The connec­
tion seems especially close after 1995 but 
is not quite as well aligned prior to 1995. 
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the 
hotel markets, along with other commer­
cial property markets, were distorted by 
legislation that gave favorable tax treat­
m ent to real estate and encouraged 
unsound lending by U.S. Saving and Loan 
Associations in commercial real estate. 
Corcorcan and Hendershott and Kane,
among others, document the perverse 
behavior and market disruptions stem­
ming from those legislative actions.9 One 
possible explanation for a disconnection 
between LIBOR and RevPAR during the 
1987-through-1995 subperiod and for a 
closer connection after 1995 is that the full 
effects o f the Savings and Loan crisis and 
Resolution Trust Corporation’s disposal 
o f assets did not entirely clear the hotel 
markets until 1995. The correlation statis­
tics reported below indicate no differences 
in the relationship during the early and 
later subperiods for the STR census of 
U.S. hotels, but noticeable differences 
appear for certain hotel market segments 
and location subdivisions.
Exhibit 3 presents Pearson and Spearman 
correlation coefficients using monthly 
data for total U.S., market-segment, and 
location-segment RevPARs with three- 
month LIBOR. These statistics appear for 
the entire study period, the subperiod 
1987 M1 through 1994 M12 (subperiod 
1), and the subperiod 1995 M1 through 
2004 M2 (subperiod 2). Correlations for 
the U.S. RevPAR and three-month LIBOR 
are significant at the 0.01 level for the 
entire study period and for each subperiod. 
The presence o f outliers elevates the coef­
ficients slightly, as indicated by the lower 
Spearman statistics, although the level o f 
sta tistical significance rem ains high 
regardless o f the measure used.
Evaluating the data within subperiods 
reveals some interesting subtleties in the 
relationships. W hile the correlations 
appear quite high for the entire period, 
they elevate to noticeably higher numbers 
when data are separated into subperiods. 
The likely reason that national RevPAR 
and LIBOR levels correlate more closely 
during the shorter intervals than they do 
during the overall period stems from the 
fact that the long-term correlations span 
two quite different cycles, while the short­
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Exhibit 2:
Trends in U.S. RevPAR and Three-m onth LIBOR, 1987 M 1 -2 0 0 4  M2
$ %
12.00
Date
10.00
00
6.00
4.00
2.00
0.00
Source: Smith Travel Research and Federal Reserve
term correlations result from data within 
single cyclical periods. Nevertheless, 
these correlations remain significant at the 
0.01 level for all periods. As additional 
evidence o f short-term correlation differ­
ences (not shown), the Pearson statistic 
increases to 0.93 using data from the 
period 1999 M1 through 2004 M2.
M ost m arket- and location-segment 
RevPARs appear highly correlated with 
LIBOR, particularly during subperiod 2. 
Negative, significant correlations for the 
luxury and midscale without F&B seg­
ments estimated for the entire study period 
may be caused by relationships in sub­
period 1. Since 1995, all o f the RevPARs 
for segments correlate highly and posi­
tively with LIBOR. The inconsistencies in 
relationships during subperiod 1 com­
pared with the entire sample period and 
subperiod 2 may be due in part to the mar­
ket disruptions mentioned earlier but also 
to the ways in which segments and STR 
definitions changed overtime. The lowest 
correlations appear for resorts, but resorts’
room revenues constitute only about one- 
half o f total revenues, which may account 
for the relatively lower correlations.
RevPAR-elasticity Estimates and Changes
An understanding o f how the levels of 
RevPAR and LIBOR behave over time 
helps hotel owners and investors deter­
mine the placement proportions o f fixed- 
rate and floating-rate hotel debt. The data 
presented above indicate a strong ten­
dency for LIBOR and RevPAR to decline 
in concert. These results suggest that 
intermediate- and long-term financial dis­
tress can be managed with floating-rate 
contracts. In addition, hotel CFOs and 
investors should know as much as possible 
about how period-to-period changes in 
L IB O R  rela te  to the same p e r io d ’s 
changes in RevPAR. We approach these 
questions by analyzing the interest elastic­
ity o f RevPAR with respect to LIBOR and 
the correlations between LIBOR changes 
and RevPAR changes.
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Exhib it 3:
C orre la tions  be tw een  M o n th ly  Hotel RevPARs and T h ree -m on th  LIBOR, 1987 
M 1-2004  M 2 and S ubpe riods
Hotel
RevPAR
Three-m onth LIBOR
1987 M 1 -2004 M 2 1987 M 1 -1994 M 12 1995 M 1 -2004  M 2
Pearson Spearm an Pearson Spearm an Pearson Spearm an
RUS .57* .53* .80* .73* .81* .6 8 *
RLUX - . 2 2 * - .3 2 * -.4 7 * -.4 9 * .61* .50*
RUU .32* .37* .70* .6 8 * .80* .70*
RUP .25* .28* .48* 2 3 * * .8 8 * .6 6 *
RMFB .81* .78* .81* .74* .90* .67*
RMID - .14** _ 1 7 * * -.13 -.09 .77* .62*
RECO .85* .83* .83* .76* .94* .70*
RIND .45* .47* .83* .78* .67* .57*
RURB .2 1 * .26* .76* .72* .67* .56*
RSUB .65* .59* .77* .6 8 * .87* .69*
RAIR .65* .57* .77* .69* .89* .70*
RHW .83* .82* .79* .73* .87* .67*
RRES .2 1 * .2 0 * .78* .79* .50* .41*
Source: Smith Travel Research and Federal Reserve
Note: This table shows Pearson and Spearman correlations coefficients forU.S. Revenue per Available Room (RevPAR), 
market-segment RevPARs, and location-segment RevPARs with three-month LIBOR. All data are in levels. The RevPAR 
dataare seasonally adjustedand inreal dollars. Correlations are presentedforthe entire studyperiod 1987M1-2004M2 (N 
= 206), the subperiod 1987M1-1994M12 (n =96),andthe subperiod 1995M1-2004M2 (n =110).RUS=RevPARU.S. 
Total; RLUX = RevPAR Luxury Segment; RUU = RevPAR Upper Upscale Segment; RUP = RevPAR Upscale Segment; 
RMFB = RevPAR Midprice with F&B Segment; RMID = RevPAR Midprice without F&B Segment; RECO = RevPAR 
Economy Segment; RIND = RevPAR Independent Segment; RURB = RevPAR Urban Location; RSUB = RevPAR Subur­
ban Location; RAIR = RevPAR Airport Location; RHW = RevPAR Highway Location; and RRES = RevPAR Resort 
Location.
RevPAR’s Interest Elasticity
The interest-elasticity statistics indicate 
the percentage change in RevPAR given a 
percentage change in LIBOR. Thus, these 
statistics reveal information about the 
monthly response rate o f hotel-room reve­
nue to interest-rate changes. Note that we 
estimate an empirical response rate, and 
therefore, no causal relationship between 
LIBOR and RevPAR is implied.
Exhibit 4 presents monthly interest- 
elasticity estimates for the same hotel cat­
egories previously evaluated. The num­
bers indicate the interest-inelastic nature 
o f RevPAR at the monthly level o f fre­
quency. For all U.S. properties, a 1 percent 
change in LIBOR corresponds to approxi­
mately a 0.10 percent change in RevPAR. 
Thus, on a percentage basis, monthly 
RevPAR responds in a modest, statistically 
significant way to monthly changes in 
LIBOR.10 In numerical terms, if  LIBOR 
equals 2.0 percent and RevPAR equals 
$50 on average, a 10 percent change in 
LIBOR to 2.2 percent corresponds to a 1 
percent change in RevPAR up to $50.50.
The central concern here rests with debt 
coverage and having sufficient cash flow 
for rising paym ents as in terest rates 
increase. The elasticity analysis supports 
the hypothesis th a t h o te ls ’ incom es 
change coincidently with changing inter­
est rates. We address the question of 
whether the changes in income would
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Exhibit 4:
M onth ly  Interest-elasticity Estimates— Hotel RevPARs and Three-m onth LIBOR,
1987 M 1-2004 M2 and Subperiods
Hotel RevPAR 1987 M 1 -2 0 0 4  M 2  1987 M 1-1994  M 12  1995 M 1 -2 0 0 4  M 2
RUS .06* .1 0 *
*00o
RLUX .06* o CD * .1 0 *
RUU .06*
*00o .1 2 *
RUP .05* .0 1 .1 2 *
RMFB .1 0 * .1 2 * .1 0 *
RMID . 0 0 .0 1 .04*
RECO .15* .2 1 * .1 0 *
RIND .04* .09* .06*
RURB .04* .09* o CD *
RSUB .06* o CD *
*00o
RAIR o CD * .1 1 * .1 2 *
RHW .06* o CD * .05*
RRES .03* .07* .04*
Source: Smith Travel Research and Federal Reserve
cover changes in debt-service obligations 
later in this article.
Quarterly Changes in RevPAR and LIBOR
The graphical and correlation analysis 
that uses levels data since 1987 demon­
strates that when hotel RevPARs decline 
to low levels across all market segments. 
short-term interest rates also reach low 
levels. Because period-to-period interest- 
rate and RevPAR changes have a direct 
bearing on financial distress associated 
with debt contracts, we perform a parallel 
analysis using quarterly changes in LIBOR 
and hotel RevPAR. Examining quarterly 
changes avoids the effects of the extreme 
short-term volatility that are found in 
monthly changes. In addition, this type of 
data analysis allows for the use o f nominal 
denominations that correspond directly to 
collected room revenues.
Exhibits 5 and 6 present graphical and 
statistical evidence of a close relationship 
between quarterly changes in LIBOR and
RevPAR from 19871 through 2003 IV. As 
with the graphical view of the levels data, 
the quarterly  changes align w ithout 
noticeable leads and lags. Also, the rela­
tionship seems particularly strong since 
1995. The correlations presented in Exhibit 
5 generally confirm these observations. 
As is usually the case, we observe weaker 
re la tio n sh ip s betw een  changes than 
between levels, but the correlations are 
close to the estimates with levels data and 
show high significance for the entire period 
and for subperiod 2. For subperiod 1 and 
for some market segments, though, the 
results appear weak. Finally, the small dif­
ferences between Pearson and Spearman 
measures indicate that the presence o f out­
liers is inconsequential.
Analysis of Individual Property Data
The possibility exists that aggregation 
o f data will bias statistical results. Thus, 
we obtained data from STR on individual 
properties’ RevPARs and repeated the
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Exhib it 5:
Q uarterly  Changes in Three-m onth LIBOR and U.S. RevPAR, 1987  I-2 0 0 3  IV
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Source: Smith Travel Research and Federal Reserve
analysis performed on the aggregates. Per 
our request, STR provided data on all 
properties for which RevPARs are avail­
able for every month within either o f the 
two subperiods studied with the aggregate 
data (those being 1987 M 1-1994M 12 and 
1995 M 1-2004 M2). Filtering these data 
involved constructing same-size samples 
for the two periods. We do not compute 
correlations for the entire period to limit 
survivorship bias.
Pearson correlation coefficients appear 
in Exhibit 7 for all market segments and 
locations. Note that the samples are of 
equal sizes for the two subperiods across 
all segments and locations, but these sam­
ples do not consist o f the same properties. 
The total number o f properties in each 
subperiod equals 2,414. The same 2,414 
properties are divided first into market 
segments and then into locations to gener­
ate the results in Exhibit 7.
The correlations between individual- 
property RevPARs and LIBOR closely 
resemble the correlation findings using 
RevPAR aggregates. Thus, aggregation 
bias does not appear to be an issue with our
analysis presented above. With the excep­
tion ofthe luxury segment, for which there 
are only thirteen available observations, 
we found high percentages o f positive, 
statistically significant correlations. As in 
the aggregate data analysis, the correla­
tions from the later subperiod universally 
exceed those from the early subperiod.
A Comparison of Fixed-rate and Floating-rate Debt for Hotels
The significant, positive correlations 
between RevPAR and LIBOR since 1987 
suggest that hotel owners who financed 
properties with floating-rate debt better 
aligned debt payments with room revenue 
than did those who used fixed-rate debt. 
To assess whether this alignment miti­
gated financial distress, we present the 
results o f a simulation that tracks how the 
average hotel owner would have fared by 
financing with fixed-rate rather than 
floating-rate debt.
Our examination o f financial distress 
focuses on the debt-coverage ratio (DCR), 
which is net operating income after the Fur­
niture, Fixture, and Equipment (FF&E)
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Exhibit 6:
Correlations between Q uarterly D ifference in Hotel RevPARs and Three-month
LIBOR, 1987 M 1-2004 M2 and Subperiods
Hotel
RevPAR
Three-m onth LIBOR
1987 Q 1-2003  Q4 1987 Q 1 -1994 Q4 1995 Q 1-2003  Q4
Pearson Spearm an Pearson Spearm an Pearson Spearm an
CRUS .35* 2 8 ** .28 .23 .52* .42**
CRLUX .25** .15 .13 .03 .42** .35**
CRUU 2 7 * * .16 .15 .03 .43* .39**
CRUP .25** .09 .05 .0 1 .44* .26
CRMFB .37* .30** .26 .26 .55* .39**
CRMID . 2 2 .16 .15 . 1 1 .33 .27
CRECO .32* .35* . 2 0 .24 .49* .49*
CRIND .42* .38* .31 .29 .63* .56*
CRURB 2 8 ** .18 .17 .13 .45* .32
CRSUB .36* 2 8 ** .31 . 2 1 .51* .39**
CRAIR .34* .16 .14 . 0 0 .56* .4 0 **
CRHW .32* 2 8 ** .30 .32 .42* .35**
CRRES .35* 2 8 ** .15 . 1 1 .58* .52*
Source: Smith Travel Research and Federal Reserve
Note: This table presents Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients forU.S. Revenue per Available Room (RevPAR), 
market-segment RevPARs, and location-segment RevPARs against three-month LIBOR. The RevPAR data are nominal. 
Correlation coefficients are for quarterly differences in RevPAR (seasonally adjusted) with LIBOR differences and appear 
forthe entire studyperiod1987Q1-2003Q4(n =67),the subperiod1987Q1-1994Q4(n=31),andthe subperiod1995Q1- 
2003 Q4 (n = 36). CRUS = Change in RevPAR U.S. Total; CRLUX = Change in RevPAR Luxury Segment; CRUU = 
Change in RevPAR UpperUpscale Segment; CRUP = Change in RevPARUpscale Segment; CRMFB = Change in RevPAR 
Midprice with F&B Segment; CRMID = Change in RevPAR Midprice without F&B Segment; CRECO = Change in 
RevPAR Economy Segment; CRIND = Change in RevPAR Independent Segment; CRURB = Change in RevPAR Urban 
Location; CRSUB = Change in RevPAR Suburban Location; CRAIR = Change in RevPAR Airport Location; CRHW = 
Change in RevPAR Highway Location; and CRRES = Change in RevPAR Resort Location.
* Significant at .01. ** Significant at .05.
reserve is divided by debt payments. The 
DCR indicates the level o f operating 
income that a hotel generates for every 
dollar that its owners are obligated to pay 
lenders. The lower the DCR, the less abil­
ity owners have to meet contractual debt 
payments and, thus, the greater the poten­
tial for financial distress.
Hotel Mortgage-simulation Methodology
The sim ulation exercise performed 
here incorporates three different hotel 
types: limited-service hotels, full-service 
hotels, and resorts.11 The first mortgage- 
origination date in the simulation is Janu­
ary 1, 1987, with subsequent origination 
dates o f January 1 o f each year through 
1999. This yields thirteen different loan- 
origination dates for each o f the three 
types o f hotels.
For each origination date and hotel 
type, we compare pairs o f mortgages that 
are identical in all respects except for 
interest-rate terms, such that one mort­
gage in the pair carries a fixed rate and the 
other a floating rate. The mortgage terms 
used in the simulation are typical for hotel 
properties as follows:
• We compute fixed-rate payments using 
the prevailing market rate for hotel
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Exhib it 7:
C orre la tions  be tw een  In d iv idu a l P rope rty  RevPAR and LIBOR, by S e gm e n t and 
S ubpe riod
Segm ent
Ha : Correlation > 0
N um ber 
o f Hotels
% Positively  
Correlated
Significant 
at 10%
% Statistical
Significant 
at 5%
Significant 
at 1%
Panel A: Pearson correlation coefficients, 1987 M 1-1994 M 12
RLUX 13 30.77 23.08 7.69 7.69
RUU 398 80.40 71.61 69.85 63.82
RUP 163 63.80 56.44 50.92 44.17
RMFB 839 68.18 56.02 51.49 44.70
RMID 321 61.37 50.16 47.04 41.43
RECO 431 71.23 60.32 57.77 51.51
RIND 249 56.22 39.36 36.55 33.33
Tota l/average 2,414 61.71 51.00 45.90 40.95
RURB 356 55.90 42.13 38.76 30.62
RSUB 845 67.46 57.16 52.66 45.68
RAIR 347 62.25 49.86 46.97 42.65
RHW 696 63.99 53.74 50.57 44.54
RRES 170 62.94 45.29 41.18 32.35
Tota l/average 2,414 62.51 49.64 46.03 39.17
Panel B: Pearson correlation coefficients, 1995 M 1 -20 04 M 2
RLUX 13 69.23 53.85 53.85 53.85
RUU 398 74.12 65.58 63.07 57.54
RUP 163 90.80 87.73 84.05 81.60
RMFB 839 72.47 60.19 57.21 50.06
RMID 321 84.11 78.82 74.77 67.60
RECO 431 77.49 66.59 63.34 57.08
RIND 249 72.69 59.84 56.22 50.20
Tota l/average 2,414 77.27 67.51 64.64 59.70
RURB 356 71.07 59.55 56.74 49.72
RSUB 845 82.01 74.32 71.60 6 6 . 8 6
RAIR 347 77.81 71.47 70.32 65.13
RHW 696 78.74 69.25 66.67 61.35
RRES 170 74.71 61.18 57.65 50.00
Tota l/average 2,414 76.87 67.15 64.60 58.61
Source: Smith Travel Research and Federal Reserve
Note: This table presents Pearson correlation coefficients for Revenue per Available Room (RevPAR) from thousands of 
properties and for LIBOR by hotel market segment and two subperiods. Subperiods are used in the analysis to limit 
survivorship bias. RLUX = RevPAR Luxury Segment; RUU = RevPARUpperUpscale Segment; RUP = RevPAR Upscale 
Segment; RMFB = RevPAR Midprice with F&B Segment; RMID = RevPAR Midprice without F&B Segment; RECO = 
RevPAR Economy Segment; RIND = RevPAR Independent Segment; RURB = RevPAR Urban Location; RSUB = 
RevPAR Suburban Location; RAIR = RevPAR Airport Location; RHW = RevPAR Highway Location; and RRES = 
RevPAR Resort Location.
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mortgages at the time of loan origina­
tion. Fixed-rate data for hotel mortgages 
come from the American Council of 
Life Insurers (ACLI).
• A resetting of floating-rate payments 
occurs every January based on the pre­
vailing three-month LIBOR plus a mar­
gin. For loans originated in January 
1996 and thereafter, the margin equals 
the prevailing market margin for float- 
ing-rate hotel mortgages at the time of 
loan origination. For loans originated in 
January 1995 and earlier, we estimated 
the margin each year using the contem­
poraneous spread between rates on 
fixed-rate hotel mortgages and ten-year 
U.S. Treasury notes.12 Floating-rate 
margin data are from the ACLI, and 
LIBOR data come from the Federal 
Reserve.
• We base payments on an assumed 
twenty-five-year amortization schedule, 
with aballoonpayment after five years.
• Principal balances at origination are 
based on a loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of
67.1 percent, which is the average LTV 
ratio over the study period, computed 
with ACLI data. We also use alternative 
LTVs of 1,000 and 2,000 basis points 
greater than the average (i.e., 77.1 per­
cent and 87.1 percent) in the simulation 
for comparison purposes.
• Hotel valuations are calculated as
NET OPERATING INCOME -  FF& E RESERVE 
CAPITALIZATION RATE ’
where net operating income is computed 
using the mortgage-origination-year 
RevPAR; percentage of revenues is 
derived from other revenues, such as 
food and beverage; and profit margin. 
STR is the source of all RevPAR data. 
Historical information about other-reve- 
nues percentages and profit margins 
comes from the Hospitality Research 
Group of PKF Consulting. By assump­
tion, the FF&E reserve equals 5 percent 
of total hotel revenues. Capitalization 
rates exactly align with the prevailing 
market-capitalization rates used in hotel 
valuations at the time of mortgage origi­
nation. Capitalization-rate data come 
from the Real Estate Research Corpora­
tion surveys.
Debt-coverage Methodology
For all mortgages, we compute the 
DCR during each year o f a mortgage’s 
five-year life. This produces a total of 
sixty-five yearly debt-coverage observa­
tions, for each combination o f fixed- or 
floating-rate mortgage, LTV ratio (i.e., 
67.1, 77.1, or 87.1 percent), and hotel type 
(i.e., lim ited service, full service, or 
resort).13 Then, for each combination of 
m ortgage-interest-rate type, LTV, and 
hotel type, we calculate how frequently 
the DCR falls below the threshold range of 
1.00 to 1.50.14
Debt-coverage Results, 1987 to 2004
Debt-coverage results forthe simulated 
loans appear in Exhibit 8. The more often 
the DCR falls below the debt-coverage 
threshold, the greater the potential for 
financial distress. Industry data indicate 
that the approximate long-term range for 
DCRs is 1.38 through 1.53.15 To focus the 
discussion, assume that a DCR o f less than 
1.40 triggers concerns about the financial 
viability o f the hotel. Panel A o f Exhibit 8 
shows that limited-service hotel owners 
who financed with fixed-rate mortgages at 
a 67.1 percent LTV would have experi­
enced a sub-1.40 DCR 12.31 percent of 
the time versus 6.15 percent o f the time for 
those who financed with floating-rate 
mortgages, a difference that suggests that 
floating-rate mortgages mitigated finan­
cial distress. For the limited-service seg­
ment, the benefits o f choosing floating- 
rate mortgages are greater for owners who 
were more aggressive (i.e., chose a higher 
LTV) in financing their properties. The 
frequency differential equals 18.46 per­
centage points for a 77.1 percent LTV and 
26.15 percentage points for an 87.1 
percent LTV.
Panel B shows that the floating-rate 
mortgage benefits o f reduced financial
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Exhib it 8:
S im u la ted  Hotel M o rtg a g e  A na lys is
67.1% LTV 77.1% LTV 87.1% LTV
DCR
Fixed
(%)
Floating
(%)
Difference
(%)
Fixed
(%)
Floating
(%)
Difference
(%)
Fixed
(%)
Floating
(%)
Difference
(%)
Panel A: Lim ited service 
< 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.54 0.00 -1.54 6.15 4.62 -1.54
< 1.10 1.54 0.00 -1.54 4.62 3.08 -1.54 13.85 7.69 -6.15
< 1.20 3.08 1.54 -1.54 9.23 6.15 -3 .08 30.77 16.92 -13.85
< 1.30 6.15 4.62 -1.54 23.08 13.85 -9.23 52.31 23.08 -29.23
< 1.40 12.31 6.15 -6.15 38.46 20.00 -18.46 69.23 43.08 -26.15
< 1.50 23.08 15.38 -7.69 58.46 29.23 -29.23 86.15 58.46 -27.69
Panel B: Full service 
< 1.00 9.23 6.15 -3.08 9.23 6.15 -3 .08 15.38 9.23 -6.15
< 1.10 9.23 6.15 -3 .08 12.31 7.69 -4.62 29.23 16.92 -12.31
< 1.20 10.77 6.15 -4.62 24.62 15.38 -9.23 49.23 24.62 -24.62
< 1.30 15.38 9.23 -6.15 43.08 21.54 -21.54 61.54 26.15 -35.38
< 1.40 29.23 15.38 -13.85 53.85 24.62 -29.23 73.85 32.31 -41.54
< 1.50 43.08 21.54 -21.54 67.69 30.77 -36.92 81.54 43.08 -38 .46
Panel C: Resort 
< 1.00 1.54 0.00 -1.54 6.15 1.54 -4.62 15.38 10.77 -4.62
< 1.10 3.08 0.00 -3 .08 12.31 9.23 -3 .08 29.23 18.46 -10.77
< 1.20 10.77 3.08 -7.69 29.23 16.92 -12.31 41.54 29.23 -12.31
< 1.30 15.38 10.77 -4.62 33.85 23.08 -10.77 52.31 32.31 -20 .00
< 1.40 29.23 18.46 -10.77 43.08 29.23 -13.85 70.77 36.92 -33 .85
< 1.50 33.85 23.08 -10.77 56.92 33.85 -23 .08 81.54 41.54 -40 .00
Source: American Council ofLife Insurance, Federal Reserve, Hospitality Research Group ofPKF Consulting, Real Estate Research Corporation, and Smith 
Travel Research
Note: This table presents results from the hotel mortgage simulation based on data from 1987 through 2003. The table shows how frequentlythe debt-cover- 
age ratio (DCR) was below thresholds ranging from 1.00to1.50with fixed-rate and floating-rate mortgages for a given loan-to-value ratio (LTV; 67.1,77.1,or 
87.1 percent) and hotel business (limited service, full service, or resort). This frequency calculation is made by dividingthe number ofDCR observations that 
were below the threshold by the total of sixty-five DCR observations. Panel A presents results for limited-service hotels, Panel B for full-service hotels, and 
Panel C for resorts.
distress were even greater for full-service 
hotel owners than for owners o f limited- 
service properties. The frequency differ­
ential equals 13.85 percentage points fora
67.1 percent LTV, 29.23 percentage points 
for a 77.1 percent LTV, and 41.54 percent­
age points for an 87.1 percent LTV. Panel 
C shows the same pattern o f reduced 
financial distress for resort owners who 
financed properties with floating-rate 
mortgages. The frequency differential 
equals 10.77 percentage points for a 67.1
percent LTV, 13.85 percentage points for a
77.1 percent LTV, and 33.85 percentage 
points for an 87.1 percent LTV.
An inspection  o f DCR thresholds 
above and below 1.40 tells the same story 
o f reduced financial distress for hotel 
owners who financed properties with 
floating-rate mortgages. For every DCR 
threshold and every hotel business, the 
frequency of financial distress for float- 
ing-rate financing was less than or equal to 
the frequency for fixed-rate arrangements.
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Thus, we conclude that the DCR results 
from the simulation experiment show that 
the positive relationship between RevPAR 
and LIBO R translates into m itigated 
financial distress for hotel owners who 
finance with floating-rate debt. When 
hotel-operating cash flows decline, debt 
payments also decline, thus mitigating 
financial distress.
Debt-coverage Results during Periods of Increasing Interest Rates
The United States experienced a long- 
run downward trend in interest rates dur­
ing the study period 1987 M1 through 
2004 M2. We w anted to  determ ine 
whether the relationships that we found 
would hold with an upward interest-rate 
trend. A close examination o f Exhibits 2 
and 5 shows coincidental movement o f the 
two series both upward and downward. 
While the periods of coincidental upward 
movement are too few in number to enable 
atime-series correlation analysis, we aug­
mented the simulation to focus on the five- 
year periods when interest rates increased, 
namely, 1987 to 1991, 1992 to 1996, 1993 
to 1997, 1994 to 1998, and 1996 to 2000. 
The mean increase in LIBOR for these 
periods equals 1.32 percent, and the 
median increase was 1.41 percent. We 
executed the same simulation as described 
above for these five periods. The results, 
shown in Exhibit 9, reveal similar advan­
tages from floating-rate debt structures. In 
almost every scenario, the floating-rate 
structure exposes borrowers to less finan­
cial distress than does the fixed-rate 
alternative.
Summary and Conclusion
Motivation for this study comes from 
the desire to analyze debt structures and 
thus enable hotel investors to minimize the 
costs of financial distress by successfully
matching debt-service obligations with 
cash flow. In the case o f hotels, investors 
may believe that revenues and net operat­
ing  in co m es have a p o s itiv e  ( i.e ., 
procyclical) relationship with interest 
rates, and thus, floating-rate debt stands as 
a viable alternative. Yet investors could 
become hesitant to aggressively finance 
ho te ls  w ith  flo a tin g -ra te  struc tu res 
because (1) the relationship between hotel 
incomes and interest rates periodically 
may be disturbed by the complicating 
influences of consumption decisions on 
the demand side and investment decisions 
on the supply side of the underlying mar­
kets, and (2) no empirical studies exist to 
confirm or refute the argument that hotel 
income and interest rates have a long-run 
stable and positive relation.
The results that we reported here dem­
onstrate that hotel revenues and LIBOR 
have been highly and significantly corre­
lated since 1987 and especially so since 
1995. Correlations o f monthly levels and 
quarterly changes are consistently strong 
across nearly all market segments and 
locations. A simulation comparing fixed- 
rate loans and floating-rate loans demon­
strates that the costs o f financial distress 
can be most effectively managed with 
floating-rate debt, based on the best avail­
able historical information. These results 
affirmatively answer the central questions 
about the strength and stability o f the rela­
tionship, but questions remain about how 
investors might use this information.
Paramount among the remaining ques­
tions is one o f determining the best mix of 
fixed rates and floating rates for financing 
hotel investments.16 W hile finding the 
optimal mix o f payment structures was not 
a direct target o f this study, our results pro­
vide some guidance. If  financing choices 
can be considered as a continuum, at the 
extreme left on this continuum is 100 per­
cent fixed-rate debt and on the extreme
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Exh ib it 9:
S im u la ted  Hotel M o rtg a g e  A na lys is
67.1% LTV 77.1% LTV 87.1% LTV
DCR
Fixed
(%)
Floating
(%)
Difference
(%)
Fixed
(%)
Floating
(%)
Difference
(%)
Fixed
(%)
Floating
(%)
Difference
(%)
Panel A: Lim ited service 
< 1 . 0 0  0 . 0 0  0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 4.00 0 . 0 0 -4 .00 1 2 . 0 0 8 . 0 0 -4 .0 0
< 1 . 1 0 4.00 0 . 0 0 -4 .0 0 8 . 0 0 4.00 -4 .00 2 0 . 0 0 1 2 . 0 0 - 8 . 0 0
< 1 . 2 0 4.00 4.00 0 . 0 0 16.00 8 . 0 0 - 8 . 0 0 36.00 24.00 - 1 2 . 0 0
< 1.30 1 2 . 0 0 8 . 0 0 -4 .0 0 32.00 2 0 . 0 0 - 1 2 . 0 0 48.00 28.00 - 2 0 . 0 0
< 1 . 4 0 2 0 . 0 0 8 . 0 0 - 1 2 . 0 0 40.00 24.00 -16 .00 60.00 40.00 - 2 0 . 0 0
< 1 . 5 0 32.00 24.00 - 8 . 0 0 5 2 . 0 0 36.00 -16 .00 80.00 64.00 16.00
Panel B: Full service 
< 1 . 0 0  1 2 . 0 0 4.00 - 8 . 0 0 1 2 . 0 0 4.00 - 8 . 0 0 16.00 8 . 0 0 - 8 . 0 0
< 1 . 1 0 1 2 . 0 0 4.00 - 8 . 0 0 16.00 4.00 - 1 2 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 16.00 -4 .0 0
< 1 . 2 0 1 2 . 0 0 4.00 - 8 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 1 2 . 0 0 - 8 . 0 0 28.00 28.00 0 . 0 0
< 1.30 16.00 8 . 0 0 - 8 . 0 0 28.00 2 0 . 0 0 - 8 . 0 0 40.00 28.00 - 1 2 . 0 0
< 1 . 4 0 2 0 . 0 0 1 2 . 0 0 - 8 . 0 0 28.00 28.00 0 . 0 0 64.00 44.00 - 2 0 . 0 0
< 1 . 5 0 2 8 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 - 8 . 0 0 5 2 . 0 0 40.00 - 1 2 . 0 0 7 2 . 0 0 44.00 -28 .00
Panel C: Resort 
< 1 . 0 0  4 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 -4 .0 0 1 2 . 0 0 4.00 - 8 . 0 0 24.00 2 0 . 0 0 -4 .0 0
< 1 . 1 0 8 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 - 8 . 0 0 24.00 16.00 - 8 . 0 0 36.00 24.00 - 1 2 . 0 0
< 1 . 2 0 2 0 . 0 0 8 . 0 0 - 1 2 . 0 0 36.00 24.00 - 1 2 . 0 0 44.00 40.00 -4 .0 0
< 1.30 24.00 2 0 . 0 0 -4 .0 0 40.00 28.00 - 1 2 . 0 0 5 2 . 0 0 40.00 - 1 2 . 0 0
< 1 . 4 0 36.00 24.00 - 1 2 . 0 0 44.00 40.00 -4 .00 60.00 52.00 - 8 . 0 0
< 1 . 5 0 40.00 28.00 - 1 2 . 0 0 5 2 . 0 0 44.00 - 8 . 0 0 7 6 . 0 0 60.00 -16 .00
Source: American Council ofLife Insurance, Federal Reserve, Hospitality Research Group ofPKF Consulting, Real Estate Research Corporation, and Smith 
Travel Research
Note: This table presents results from the hotel mortgage simulation for five-year periods between 1987 and 2003 that were characterized by increasing 
LIBOR: specifically, 1987to 1991, 1992 to 1997, 1993 to 1998, 1994to 1999, and 1996 to 2001. Thetable shows how frequentlythe debt-coverage ratio 
(DCR) was below thresholds ranging from 1.00 to 1.50 with fixed-rate and floating-rate mortgages for a given loan-to-value ratio (LTV; 67.1, 77.1, or 87.1 
percent) and hotel business (limited service, full service, orresort). This frequency calculation is made by dividingthe number ofDCR observations that were 
below the threshold by the total of twenty-five DCR observations. Panel A presents results for limited-service hotels, Panel B for full-service hotels, and Panel 
C for resorts.
right is 100 percent floating-rate financ­
ing. Real-estate investors may be tempted 
to begin on the left end with entirely fixed- 
rate debt then move to the right by substi­
tuting floating-rate debt as relative terms 
and risks indicate. Given the fixed-income 
patterns associated with leased properties, 
this approach appears logical for office, 
retail, apartments, and industrial-real- 
estate financing. The absence o f leases 
suggests the opposite approach for hotel
finance, beginning hotel debt-financing 
arrangements with 100 percent floating- 
rate debt and then adding fixed-rate debt 
as conditions dictate. The most obvious 
conditions for this substitution to occur 
are when leased components, such as 
retail, contribute m easurably to total 
property income.
Another remaining question is whether 
hotel owners are wise to lock into fixed- 
rate debt during periods of relatively low
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interest rates. In the absence o f profitable 
arbitrage opportunities, the long-term rate 
represents an average of the current short­
term rate and expected future short-term 
rates. When long-term rates are relatively 
low, participants in the financial markets 
expect that future short-term rates will 
also be relatively low. The implication is 
that hotel owners, on average, will not pay 
a lower average rate by taking out a fixed- 
rate loan over a floating-rate loan .17 
Empirical evidence supports this claim, 
showing that corporate managers do not 
exhibit an ability to time their debt issues 
to take advantage o f low rates.18 Unless the 
hotel owner knows more about the direc­
tion o f future interest rates than others in 
the credit markets, then trying to lock in a 
fixed rate at the bottom o f the market is 
futile. Rather than try to market-time 
interest rates, hotel owners’ efforts are 
better spent trying to manage financial 
distress by aligning operating cash flows 
and debt-service obligations. Our study 
suggests tha t hotel ow ners can best 
achieve this alignment through floating- 
rate debt as opposed to fixed-rate debt.
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